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Perhaps no other crime in American history has shocked the con-
science of America like the 1963 bombing of the Sixteenth Street Baptist
Church in Birmingham, Alabama. Four girls, Addie Mae Collins, Carole
Robertson, Cynthia Wesley, and Denise McNair, were killed while they
were getting ready for church that Sunday morning, September 15, 1963.1
Historians have pointed to the church bombing as the single event most
responsible for shocking White America out of its apathy for the plight of
African Americans and into action-action that led the following year to
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.2
In May of 2002-almost thirty-nine years after the bombing--
Bobby Frank Cherry was brought to trial for the murders of Addie,
Carole, Cynthia, and Denise. He was the last person to be tried for the
bombing. As an Assistant United States Attorney in Birmingham, Alabama
it was my privilege to be a part of the prosecution team that brought
Cherry to justice. This Article tells the story of that prosecution and ex-
plores the question of whether such trials, so long after the events in
question, serve any useful purpose. Part I describes the bombing and pro-
vides an historical overview of the events that led up to it. Part II
chronicles the FBI investigation of the bombing in the 1960s and the sub-
sequent prosecution of two of the bombers, Robert Chambliss and
Tommy Blanton. In Part III, I discuss the Cherry prosecution itself.
Finally, Part IV attempts to address, at least tentatively, the question
that I am asked most often about the case.While the other sections of the
* Associate Professor of Law, Cumberland Law School, Samford University. Pro-
fessor Cochran would like to thank Deborah Young, Brannon Denning, Barry Friedman,
JeffWallace, Robert Posey, Doug Jones, Andy Sheldon, and Judge William Pryor for their
review of, and comments on, this Article.
1. See TAYLOR BpAscH, PARTING THE WATERS 889-92 (Simon & Schuster 1988).
2. See DIANE McWHORTER, CARRY ME HOME 572 (Simon & Schuster 2001). At a
funeral for three of the girls, Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr. predicted that "[tlhis tragic
event may cause the White South to come to terms with its conscience." Rick Bragg, 38
Years Later, Last of Suspects is Convicted in Church Bombing, N.Y.TIMES, May 23, 2002, at Al.
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Article address how the case was prosecuted, this section asks: "why?" Was
it really worth the expenditure of considerable resources so that an old
man could die in prison? Although a full answer to the question of
whether this prosecution, or any of the other recent high-profile civil
rights trials in the South, was worth the cost is beyond the scope of this
Article, Part IV proposes a conceptual model for such an analysis: princi-
ples gleaned from the rapidly expanding field of "transitional justice"-
the transition in this case being that from the repressive regime of the
American South in the 1960s and before to the modern democracy that
is the "New South."
I. THE BOMBING
In order to understand the events of Sunday, September 15, 1963, it
is necessary to know what was going on in Birmingham at the time. In
1963 Birmingham, Alabama had what were likely the strictest segregation
laws in the country. Nearly all public facilities in Birmingham, including
theaters, bus stations, parks, lunch counters, restrooms, and water foun-
tains, were segregated by race.3 Moreover, "[t]here were no Black store
clerks, secretaries, police officers, librarians, or firefighters. 4 Rather, em-
ployment for Blacks was limited largely to menial jobs like cooking,
cleaning, and working in the city's various foundries.' In the spring of
1963 Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr. brought the Southern Christian
Leadership Conference to Birmingham to join with local Black commu-
nity leaders to challenge these laws.6 The protestors' method of
challenging the city's "Jim Crow" laws was to send groups of African
Americans to attempt to integrate downtown stores and lunch counters.
Although Reverend King and the other organizers' initial plan was to use
sit-ins at the store lunch counters as their method of protest,7 most
marchers were arrested before they ever reached the stores and organizers
eventually focused on getting the maximum number of people arrested."
The chief rallying point for the protestors, primarily because of its loca-
tion several blocks from the downtown area stores, was the Sixteenth
Street Baptist Church.' Reverend King preached at the church and the
protestors used it as a place to gather together before marching to the
3. See FRANK SIKORA, UNTIL JUSTICE ROLLS DOWN: THE BIRMINGHAM CHURCH
BOMBING CASE 6 (Univ. ofAla. Press 2005) (1991).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. See MCWHORTER, supra note 2, at 307-10.
7. The Birmingham campaign was initially modeled after the successful 1960 sit-in
campaign in Nashville. BRANCH, supra note 1, at 752.
8. See id. at 764.
9. SIKORA, supra note 3, at 6.
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stores. Thus, the church became a symbol of the civil rights movement in
a city where attempts to integrate were generally met with violence."
Each time a group of protestors would violate the city's laws they
would be arrested by the Birmingham Police Department. Soon the sup-
ply of African American adults willing to be arrested ran short and leaders
of the movement began allowing children to march to the stores and to
be arrested." It was during this time period that the Birmingham Police
and Fire Departments used police dogs and high pressure fire hoses in an
attempt to control the marchers, resulting in the infamous pictures of dog
and fire hose attacks on unarmed protestors.
12
In May of 1963, Reverend King and the other movement leaders
reached an agreement with the city's White business leaders.1 3 The deal
provided for desegregation of the downtown lunch counters, bathrooms,
and water fountains and for the hiring of some Black sales clerks. The
agreement was announced publicly at a press conference on May 10.14 In
a sign that change would not come peacefully to Birmingham, that night
bombs exploded at the Gaston Motel, where Reverend King and the
other movement leaders were staying, and at the home of King's brother.' s
Racial tensions continued to mount through the summer of 1963.
In June, Governor George Wallace stood in the schoolhouse door at the
University of Alabama and attempted to prevent the registration of the
university's first two Black students.16 On August 28, 1963, the "March on
Washington" gave the civil rights movement national exposure and cul-
minated in Reverend King's famous "I Have a Dream" speech on the
national mall.' 7 Meanwhile, in Birmingham, on August 19 a federal judge
approved the Birmingham Board of Education's plan to desegregate the
city's public schools.'8 The plan was a modest one, calling only for the
10. Bombings had become so common in the city that it had earned the nickname
"Bombingham." See MCWHORTER, supra note 2, at 20. Between the end of World War I
and 1963 there were more than forty bombings in Birmingham. Rick Bragg, More Than
Just a Racist? Now The Jury Must Decide, N.Y TIMES, May 22, 2002, at A18. Remarkably,
until the bombing of the Sixteenth Street Baptist Church, no one was killed in any of
these bombings. SIKORA, supra note 3, at 66.
11. The decision to allow children to march was a controversial one within the
movement. See BRANCH, supra note 1, at 754-55; McWHORTER, supra note 2, at 363.
12. See McWORTER, supra note 2, at 370--72.
13. SIKORA, supra note 3, at 7; see MCWHORTER, supra note 2, at 421-23.
14. SIKORA, supra note 3, at 7.
15. Id.
16. See BRANCH, supra note 1, at 821-22.
17. See MCWHORTER, supra note 2, at 487-90.
18. Id. at 481. The Board's plan was the culmination of more than three years of
legal action by Black plaintiffs to integrate the Birmingham schools. In July of 1963, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit had ordered the Board to "make an
immediate start in the desegregation of the schools of Birmingham, Jefferson County,
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integration of three schools by a total of five Black students. 9 However, it
represented the first time that Black and White school children would
attend Birmingham public schools together-an act considered particu-
larly repulsive by White extremists. 20 The Birmingham schools were
scheduled to begin the school year on Wednesday, September 4. That
morning two of the Black students, eleven-year-old Dwight Armstrong
and his nine-year-old brother Floyd, went to Graymont Elementary
School, picked up their enrollment forms, and left. 21 When several White
protestors were injured in the ensuing fracas between police and White
extremists gathered to protest the integration, Governor Wallace issued an
executive order prohibiting integration of the public schools in order to
"[preserve] the peace."22 The following Monday, September 9, Wallace
amended his order, allowing the schools to open but denying entry to
Black students.2' That afternoon the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit issued a restraining order enjoining the Governor or
anyone else from interfering with the Court's desegregation order.
24
When the Kennedy administration learned, in the early morning hours of
September 10, that Wallace intended to call out the National Guard to
prevent integration, President Kennedy signed an order federalizing the
Guard and then Secretary of Defense McNamara ordered the Guard to
return to their armory.25 Thus, finally, on Tuesday morning, September 10,
the Armstrong brothers and the other three Black schoolchildren entered
the Birmingham public schools.
6
The following Sunday, September 15, was to be "Youth Day" at the
Sixteenth Street Baptist Church.27 The church's pastor, Reverend John
Cross, had recently decided to have monthly youth services and the 15"'
was scheduled to be the first, with the youth choir providing the music at
Alabama, which plan shall effectively provide for the carrying into effect not later than the
beginning of the school year commencing September 1963 . Armstrong v. Bd. of
Educ., 323 E2d 333, 339 (5th Cir. 1963).
19. See MCWHORTER, supra note 2, at 481.
20. See id. at 86. To the "Old Confederacy," "integrated primary and secondary
schools meant mixing the races at the age that mating habits were being formed, raising
the specter of miscegenation and, possibly, mass revolt." Id.
21. See id. at 494-95. The other three Black students, all high school age, did not
attempt to enter school that day, instead intending to avoid at least some of the hostile
crowds by waiting until Friday to attend school. Id. at 495.
22. Id. at 495-96.
23. See id. at 505.
24. Id. The joint restraining order was dictated by federal district judge Frank John-
son in Montgomery and signed by four other federal judges throughout the state. See id.
25. Id. at 506.
26. See BRANCH, supra note 1, at 888-89; McWHoRTER, supra note 2, at 506-07.
27. MCWHORTER, supra note 2, at 520.
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the eleven o'clock service. Five young girls who were to have a part in
the service, Carole Robertson, Cynthia Wesley, Denise McNair, and Addie
Mae Collins and her younger sister Sarah, were in the ladies lounge on
the northeast side of the church primping for their role in the service.29 At
10:22 a.m. a huge explosion rocked the church." The blast came from
underneath the exterior staircase on the northeast corner of the building,
right outside the window to the ladies lounge. 31 The exterior wall and
foundation, more than two feet thick of brick, stone, and mortar, came
crashing down on the four girls, leaving a huge crater where the concrete
stairs stood moments before.3 2 Sarah Collins, who had been watching her
older sister Addie tie the sash on the back of Denise McNair's dress, lay
buried in the rubble blinded by the blast.33 She called out for her sister:
"Addie, Addie, Addie"3 4 There was no answer.35
Reverend Cross led the congregation in looking for survivors.36
They found one body, then another, and finally a total of four bodies.37 A
fifth girl, Sarah, was found alive.38 She was taken to University Hospital,
where doctors removed twenty-one pieces of glass from her face and eyes
and more from her chest and legs.39 She was in the hospital for two more
months, finally regaining sight in her left eye, but losing her right eye al-
together.4' The other four girls were all dead on arrival at the hospital.41
Family members identified the bodies of Addie, Carole, and Denise, but
Cynthia Wesley's body was so badly damaged that she had to be identified
by her shoes and the ring on her finger.
42
28. id.
29. SIKORA, supra note 3, at 9-10.
30. McWHORTER, supra note 2, at 522; SsIoA,, supra note 3, at 11.
31. MCWHORTER, supra note 2, at 525; SioR, A, supra note 3, at 9. This exterior stair-
case was completely destroyed in the blast and never rebuilt. Today what was once the
second story door to which the staircase led is now a window, making it difficult to tell
where the stairs even stood in 1963.
32. See MCWHORTER, supra note 2, at 525; SIKORA, supra note 3, at 11.
33. SIKoRA, supra note 3, at 10-11; see MCWHORTER, supra note 2, at 523.
34. MCWHORTER, supra note 2, at 523; SIKORA, supra note 3, at 11.
35. SIKORA, supra note 3, at 11.
36. See McWHoRTER, supra note 2, at 524-25.
37. See SIKORA, supra note 3, at 13.
38. McWHORT R, supra note 2, at 525; SIKORA, supra note 3, at 13.
39. SIKORA, supra note 3, at 15.
40. See id. ("When she was released, she could see from the left eye but had a glass
right eye.")
41. See id.
42. McWHoRTmR, supra note 2, at 527.
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II.THE INVESTIGATION AND EARLIER PROSECUTIONS
The Federal Bureau of Investigation immediately became involved
in the investigation of the church bombing.43 Agents arrived at the bomb-
ing scene, taking control of the scene away from state investigators sent by
Governor Wallace." By modern standards, evidence collection at the
scene of the bombing was haphazard at best. One of the great mysteries of
the investigation involves pieces of a fishing bobber-which could have
been used as part of some sort of timing device to set off the bomb-that
were found at the scene.45 The bobber pieces never reached the FBI's
crime lab and a forensic report sent to FBI headquarters said that nothing
useful had been found at the scene.4 The lack of a meaningful crime
scene investigation would haunt prosecutors for decades-at each trial the
prosecution would be left to speculate as to the bomb's composition.
4 7
Over the next several years, FBI agents conducted hundreds of in-
terviews with potential witnesses and suspects. Fairly early in the
investigation, four Ku Klux Klansmen emerged as the prime suspects
thought to have placed the bomb at the church: Robert Chambliss,
Tommy Blanton, Bobby Frank Cherry, and Herman Cash.48 One by one,
these initial suspects would be defendants in a series of prosecutions span-
ning the next thirty nine years. All but Herman Cash, who died in 1994
43. By the night of the bombing, twenty five FBI agents had been sent to Birming-
ham. ANDREw M. MANIs, A FiREYou CAN'T PUT OUT 403-04 (Univ. of Ala. Press 1999).
44. See McWHoRTER, supra note 2, at 549.
45. A fishing bobber (a floating piece of cork or plastic attached to fishing line to
keep bait floating at a specific depth) could have been used in a crude timing device con-
sisting of a fluid-filled and leaking container. Such a timer could be devised to trigger a
bomb to go off when the fluid drained to a certain level, allowing the bobber to close an
electric circuit. FBI Special Agent John McCormick testified at the trial of Robert Cham-
bliss that he was present when other agents found the bobber evidence, but that he did
not know what happened to it. SIKORA, supra note 3, at 150.
46. MCWHORTs, supra note 2, at 533. An FBI report later conceded that the bobber
evidence had existed. Id. at 654 n.533 (citing Interview with Maurice House, Spring
1985; James R. Logan Jr. report, Oct. 4, 1963; Zimmers and Killion memorandum on
investigation of site). There has never been a satisfactory explanation as to what happened
to it.
47. In the trial of Robert Chambliss, two fire marshals testified that they smelled
dynamite at the scene and that the damage at the church was not consistent with the type
of damage that would have been caused by a natural gas explosion. SIKO.A, supra note 3, at
151-52. In the prosecutions of Tommy Blanton and Bobby Frank Cherry, prosecutors
would limit their proof to testimony that the blast was caused by "high order" explo-
sives-that is, a bomb as opposed to some other type of explosion, such as a gas leak or
boiler explosion. See SIKOmA, supra note 3, at 196, 230-31.
48. See McWHORTER, supra note 2, at 516.
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without ever being tried in the bombing, would eventually be con-
victed.49
The FBI's jurisdiction to investigate the bombing as a federal crime
was based on a Reconstruction-era civil rights statute that had a five year
statute of limitations. 0 Thus, when no charges had been brought against
anyone by September 15, 1968, any chance of federal prosecution for the
bombing ended. Even before this time, however, FBI Director J. Edgar
Hoover had effectively ended any chance of federal prosecution by not
allowing his Birmingham office to turn its evidence over to federal prose-
cutors."' In retrospect, much has been made of the FBI's failure to pursue
prosecution in the 1960s. However, in fairness to the Bureau, it is difficult
to imagine that, based on the evidence collected in the 1960s, a successful
prosecution could have been mounted against any of the suspects at the
time in front of a Birmingham, Alabama jury.1
2
In 1970 twenty-eight-year-old Bill Baxley (who had been a law
student at the University of Alabama at the time of the 1963 church
bombing) was elected Attorney General of the state of Alabama. 3 By all
accounts, Baxley took a very personal interest in the bombing and made
the investigation and prosecution of those responsible a priority in the
Attorney General (AG)'s office. 4 Baxley soon realized, however, that any
meaningful investigation would require access to the FBI's files on the
case. For the next five years Baxley tried, without success, to gain access to
the FBI files. Finally, in 1975, Baxley enlisted the aid ofTalladega, Alabama
native Jack Nelson, the Washington bureau chief for the Los Angeles
Times."5 After Nelson contacted U.S. Attorney General Edward Levi and
implied that he was going to write a story about the FBI's refusal to co-
operate with Alabama authorities in the church bombing investigation,
Baxley suddenly gained access to at least some of the FBI files. 6
For the next two years, Baxley and his prosecutors and investigators
poured over the FBI files and interviewed witnesses. After extensive
49. See R-ick Bragg, Alabama Faces Old Wound In One Last Trial, N.Y TIMES, May 12,
2002, at Al.
50. See 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (2000).
51. See MCWHORTER, supra note 2, at 574.
52. Such a jury would have been composed solely of White males. SIKORA, supra
note 3, at ix-x. While it is true that several all-White juries of that time period returned
guilty verdicts against White defendants, id. at x, the real problem is that FBI investigators
had very little evidence against any of the suspects at the time.
53. MCWHORTER, supra note 2, at 573; see Rick Bragg, Alabama Faces Old Wound In
One Last Trial, N.YTIMES, May 12,2002, at Al.
54. Baxley reportedly carried with him at all times a card with the names of the
four victims, one name in each corner, to remind himself of a vow he made the day of the
bombing to bring the killers to justice. MCWHORTER, supra note 2, at 573.
55. SIKORA, supra note 3, at 51.
56. Id. at 51-52.
FALL 2006]
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
research and investigation, the AG's team reached the same conclusion
that FBI agents had reached a decade before: the evidence pointed to
Chambliss, Blanton, Cherry, and Cash as those most likely to have placed
the bomb. Of the four, the case was clearly strongest against Chambliss.
This was true because (as described below) two witnesses could provide
damaging testimony against Chambliss, but not the other three.
The first witness who implicated Chambliss was an African Ameri-
can woman named Kirthus Glenn. Ms. Glenn had been visiting her
hometown of Birmingham from Detroit at the time of the bombing. 7 At
approximately two o'clock on the morning of September 15, Glenn was
about a block north of the church when she saw something that caught
her attention: a car with three White men."' Because the car's interior
dome light was on, Ms. Glenn was able to get a good look at one of the
men. Later shown photos by the FBI, she identified the man she saw in
the car that night as looking like Robert Chambliss. 9 Glenn was even
more certain about the car in which she saw the men. When shown a
photo of Tommy Blanton's white-on-blue 1957 Chevrolet, she said that
the car was identical to the car she saw that night near the church.6
The second witness who could provide damaging testimony against
Chambliss was his niece, Elizabeth Cobbs. Cobbs told Baxley that she had
heard three different incriminating statements by Chambliss. First, on the
day before the bombing, he told her that he "had enough stuff put away
to flatten half of Birmingham" 6' Later that same day, Chambliss said
"[y]ou just wait until after Sunday morning ... they [the Blacks] will beg
us to let them segregate.' '62 Finally, approximately a week later while
watching a news broadcast about the bombing, Chambliss said "it wasn't
meant to hurt anybody. It didn't go off when it was supposed to."
63
57. MCWHORTER, supra note 2, at 516.
58. See id. Because the church was located in a predominately Black part of a very
segregated Birmingham, the presence of three White men would have been quite unusual
at the time.
59. Id. at 563.
60. Id. at 516, 563. Investigators believe that Ms. Glenn saw the bombers after they
had dropped off a fourth man-apparently Bobby Frank Cherry-to carry the bomb
down the alley behind the church and place it under the stairs on the far side of the
church (this would explain why Glenn saw two men in the back seat and only one in
front). See id. at 516.The alley would have provided the most concealed route to the stairs
at the northeast corner of the church. Obviously, Glenn would have been an important
witness in the later Blanton and Cherry trials, but she died after the trial of Robert
Chambliss.
61. SIKOn, supra note 3, at 142.
62. Id. at 143.
63. Id. at 144.
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In September of 1977, Chambliss was indicted for the murder of
Carole Denise McNair in the church bombing case. 4 He went to trial in
November of that year and-based largely on the testimony of Kirthus
Glenn and Elizabeth Cobbs-was convicted.61 Chambliss received a life
sentence and died in prison on October 19, 1985.66
For more than fifteen years after the conviction of Robert Chain-
bliss in 1977, there was no further attempt to bring the other suspected
bombers to justice. Then, in 1994 FBI Special Agent Rob Langford, the
Special Agent in Charge of the Birmingham FBI office, met with leaders
of Birmingham's African American community in an attempt to improve
relations between the FBI and the Black community.67 While the reopen-
ing of the church bombing investigation was not a subject that Langford
had in mind, the community leaders brought it up, indicating their dissat-
isfaction with the FBI's earlier investigation. Langford promised to look
into the matter, and in 1995 reopened the investigation into the church
bombing.68
FBI Special Agent Bill Fleming was the agent assigned to reinvesti-
gate the church bombing case. The Birmingham Police Department also
assigned an officer to the case, an experienced detective named Ben Her-
ren. Fleming and Herren decided to read the entire FBI file on the case-
approximately eight thousand pages-and develop a list of people they
would like to interview. When they had finished reading the file there
were more than five hundred names on the list.69 Of this number, they
found that many had already died while many others could not be lo-
cated.7 °
Initially the investigation appeared to be headed nowhere. Fleming
and Herren were surprised to find that, despite the number of years that
had passed, none of those they interviewed provided any significant new
information on the case. Most were still utterly unrepentant about their
racial beliefs and claimed to remember nothing.
71
In July of 1997, however, the investigation finally got a break. On
the 10th of July, the FBI publicly announced the reopening of the church
64. Id. at 116-17.
65. See MCWHORTER, supra note 2, at 574.
66. Id. at 575; SIKORA, supra note 3, at 156.
67. SIKORA, supra note 3, at 169-70.
68. Id. at 170-71. Because the statute of limitations had run on any possible federal
charges, Langford spoke with Jefferson County District Attorney David Barber before
reopening the investigation. Barber agreed that if the FBI found evidence sufficient to
charge anyone, his office would assist in prosecuting for murder in state court. Id. Alabama,
like most states, has no statute of limitations for murder. ALA. CODE § 15-3-5 (1975).
69. SIKoRA, supra note 3, at 174-75.
70. Id. at 175.
71. See id.
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bombing investigation. Reacting to the news, reporters tracked down
Bobby Frank Cherry (who, along with Tommy Blanton, was one of only
two of the four original suspects still living) in Mabank, Texas. Approxi-
mately one week after the FBI's announcement Cherry-apparently tired
of issuing denials of his involvement to one reporter at a time-called a
press conference. In this news conference Cherry said that he had nothing
to do with the bombing of the Sixteenth Street Baptist Church.72 Cherry
apparently thought that this would end the matter. It had, however, quite
a different effect.
In response to Cherry's public denial, several potential witnesses
contacted the FBI.Teresa Stacey, one of Cherry's granddaughters, called to
say that he had bragged to her and other family members for years of his
involvement in the bombing.73 Michael Wayne Gowins, who met Cherry
only briefly in the early 1980's in Dallas, called to say that Cherry had
once said to him, in a conversation about the church bombing, "[y]ou
know I bombed that church. 74 Word of Cherry's denial also reached
Montana, where one his ex-wives, Willadean Brogdon, lived. Brogdon
drove more than two hundred miles to an FBI office and offered informa-
tion about Cherry's involvement in the bombing.
75
Over the next three years these witnesses, along with numerous
others, were called to testify before a federal grand jury in Birmingham.
Finally, in May of 2000, federal and state prosecutors, led by United States
Attorney Doug Jones, took the case before a Jefferson County Grand
Jury.76 In the same month, Bobby Frank Cherry and Tommy Blanton
were charged and arrested for the murders of Addie Mae Collins, Carole
Robertson, Cynthia Wesley, and Denise McNair.
7
Despite the indictments, prosecutors would not have called the case
against either Cherry or Blanton a strong one at this point. The case
against Cherry was based largely on his alleged bragging, all of which oc-
curred years after the bombing. The case against Blanton was even more
tenuous. Prosecutors drew some comfort, however, from the fact that the
cases would at least be tried together in one trial, because then the evi-
dence against both defendants would be before the jury and the jury
72. Id. at 178.
73. See id. at 178-79.
74. Transcript of Record atVol. 10, p. 224, Bobby Frank Cherry v. State of Alabama,
933 So. 2d 377 (2004) (No. CR-02-0374) [hereinafter "Record"].
75. Record atVol. 10, pp. 150-51.
76. Despite the fact that the case had been investigated for more than three years by
a federal grand jury, since federal juries cannot indict for violations of state laws, the case
had to be presented to a state grand jury for indictment. See generally ALA. R. CraM. P. 1.1
and 12.8 (Alabama state/county grand juries indict for violations of laws passed by the
state of Alabama).
77. See MCWHORTER, supra note 2, at 586.
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would hopefully find enough to convict both men. In November of 2000,
however, this strategy fell apart when Cherry produced evidence that he
might not be competent to stand trial. At a hearing on the issue, two ex-
perts testified that Cherry suffered from dementia. Finding grounds to
believe that he might not be mentally competent to assist in his own de-
fense, presiding Judge James Garrett continued the case against Cherry
indefinitely while he attempted to determine Cherry's competence to
stand trial. Thus, it appeared that the more difficult case-the one against
Tommy Blanton-would have to proceed to trial on its own. It was at this
point that prosecutors got their second big break in the case.
While preparing for the Blanton trial, prosecutors asked Fleming
and Herren to make one last check of all evidence that the Government
had in the church bombing case so that all appropriate discovery materials
could be provided to Blanton's attorney." In conducting this final check,
the investigators came across a box containing numerous audio tapes.
Fleming and Herren discovered that these tapes had been made less than a
year after the bombing by a microphone that had been placed under the
kitchen sink in the house where Blanton lived. The device had been
placed when an FBI undercover agent, posing as a truck driver, rented the
apartment adjacent to Blanton's. An FBI surveillance team had drilled un-
der the sink and had placed a microphone there, with a wire running
back to the rented apartment. The tapes consisted largely of hours of si-
lence, punctuated by unintelligible or meaningless conversations.
However, Fleming and Herren discovered that one of the recordings was
a breakthrough. This particular tape-which prosecutors came to call the
"kitchen tape"-contained a conversation that was recorded approxi-
mately nine months after the church bombing 0 The incriminating
portion of the tape, which lasted just over a minute, involved a discussion
between Tommy Blanton and his wife Jean regarding Jean's interview by
the FBI."' On the tape, Blanton acknowledges that he knew the FBI was
"interested in that meeting that I went to. 8 2 When Jean asks him to clar-
ify what meeting he is talking about, Blanton responds "the Big One.8 3
When Jean again asks for clarification, Blanton says that it was "[t]he
meeting where we planned the bomb."' Jean then conveniently
78. Record atVol. 3, pp. 461-64.
79. See SIKORA, supra note 3, at 187.
80. See Record atVol. 7, pp. 1402-03.
81. See id. Jean and Tommy Blanton were married in April 1964. SIKoRA, supra note
3, at 187.They later divorced and Jean (by the time of the trials her last name was Barnes)
was called as a witness by the State in the Cherry trial. Id. at 237.
82. Record atVol. 7, p. 1402.
83. Id.
84. Id. At two other times in the conversation Blanton goes even further, saying that
the meeting was to "make the bomb" Record atVol. 7, pp. 1402-03.
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establishes the exact date of the meeting in question by stating "[i]t's what
you were doing that Friday night when you stood me up," to which
Blanton responds "[o]h, we were making the bomb." 5 Jean later testified,
and in fact it appears to be undisputed, that the night she was referring
to-the Friday that Blanton stood her up-was Friday, September 13,
1963-two days before the church was bombed.
86
In April of 20 0 1,Tommy Blanton went on trial for the 1963 church
87bombing murders. Based largely on his owns words, heard by jurors on
the "kitchen tape'" Blanton was convicted."8 He was sentenced to impris-
onment for life89 and is still serving his sentence in the Alabama state
prison system.
III. A iABAMA v. BOBBY FRANK CHERRY
Following the success of the Blanton prosecution, it appeared that
the church bombing case had run its course. Two of the four original sus-
pects had been convicted, while a third, Herman Cash, had died without
ever being charged. 90 Meanwhile, in July of 2001 Judge Garrett ruled that
prosecutors had not shown that Cherry was mentally competent to stand
trial. 9' Before closing the books on the case, however, Judge Garrett took
one more step. In August, he ordered that Cherry be committed to the
Alabama Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation's secure
medical facility at Taylor Hardin for further testing to determine his men-
tal competence.92
85. Record atVol. 7, p. 1403.
86. SIKORA, supra note 3, at 237. Another mystery of the case is why the FBI never
discovered the "kitchen tape" before 2001. One possible explanation lies in the fact that
the clandestine taping of Blanton's conversations was part of an intelligence gathering
operation designed to prevent future bombings and, as such, the recordings were never
meant to be used in court and were never provided to the agents conducting the criminal
investigation of the bombing. Another possible reason is that the relevant conversation was
so short and was surrounded by so many hours of silence and insignificant or unintelligi-
ble dialogue that earlier agents simply never heard the incriminating portion.
87. See id. at 192-94.
88. See id. at 220-22.
89. Id. at 222.
90. See Rick Bragg, Alabama Faces Old Wound In One Last Trial, N.Y TIMES, May 12,
2002, at Al;Yvonne Lamb, Birmingham Bomber Bobby Frank Cherry Dies in Prison at 74,
WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 19, 2004, at B5.
91. Record atVol. 3, p. 464.
92. See Record at Vol. 3, pp. 468-71. It was at this point, after the trial of Tommy
Blanton, that I, then an Assistant United States Attorney in the Northern District of Ala-
bama, became directly involved in the case. Due to the departure from the U.S. Attorney's
Office of the lead prosecutor, U.S. Attorney Doug Jones, I was asked to join the prosecu-
tion team. Because of the importance of the case I did not hesitate in agreeing, even
though it was entirely unclear at this point that Cherry would ever stand trial.
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At Taylor Hardin the staff was able to watch Cherry "essentially
twenty four hours a day, seven days a week .... He was observed at times
when he knew that he was being watched and at times when he was un-
aware of surveillance. "9  Cherry was given formal tests that were clearly
designed to test his memory and competency. He was also informally
tested in ways which were not so obvious in their design and would not
have alerted Cherry as to the purpose of the tests. At the end of Cherry's
more than two months of commitment, his psychologists had noticed an
interesting fact. Whenever Cherry knew that he was being evaluated on
his competency to stand trial, he did poorly. However, at all other times
he appeared fully capable of "understanding the case against him and as-
sisting in his defense ... the consensus of the staff was unanimous-
[Cherry] was faking his lack of memory in order to appear incompetent
to stand trial ... ,9 After being presented with these facts, Judge Garrett
ruled that Cherry's competency had been restored. 9 Therefore, Cherry
was now able to adequately assist in his own defense.
At the time that Cherry was found competent to stand trial, the case
against him was built largely on the handful of witnesses who claimed to
have heard him brag about his involvement in the bombing. However,
there were a number of problems with this evidence.The witnesses closest
to Cherry had obvious reasons to be biased against Cherry. His ex-wife's
testimony was incriminating but, after all, she was an ex-wife, and for ob-
vious reasons juries often disregard the testimony of ex-spouses. His
granddaughter's testimony was likewise damaging, but questionable be-
cause she had a motive to disparage Cherry since there were allegations
that Cherry had sexually abused her. Additionally, no other member of
Cherry's family ever heard (or, perhaps more accurately, admitted to hear-
ing) similar statements by Cherry about his involvement in the bombings.
Another problem involved the timing of the alleged statements and,
even more problematic, the timing of the witnesses' reporting of them. In
most cases, the statements were made by Cherry many years after the
crime.96 Also, in every case, the witness hearing the remark did not
promptly report it to anyone. 97 Moreover, there was some question among
93. Record atVol. 6, p. 1070.
94. Id.
95. Record atVol. 3, p. 475.
96. In addition to the delayed statements reported by Cherry's ex-wife and grand-
daughter, Michael Wayne Gowins reported that Cherry told him "[y]ou know I bombed
that church" in the early 1980s-approximately twenty years after the bombing. Record at
Vol. 10, p. 224.
97. The witnesses had various explanations for their delay in reporting Cherry's
statements.The triggering event for most of the witnesses was Cherry's press conference in
July of 1997 denying his involvement. Most of the witnesses who came forward to tell of
earlier bragging by Cherry did so in reaction to this public denial of responsibility.
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the witnesses as to what act or acts Cherry admitted. Some witnesses said
that he confessed to making the bomb, while others said he admitted
placing it at the church.98
However, there was an even greater problem with Cherry's alleged
statements. In the strange and twisted subculture of Klan racists that
Cherry frequented, being one of the church bombers would be a "badge
of honor." Given this mindset, it is certainly not beyond the realm of pos-
sibility that a person might brag about being involved in the bombing
when, in fact, he had nothing to do with it. Thus, it was entirely possible
that a jury might believe that we had proven that Cherry said all these
things, but still not believe beyond a reasonable doubt that he actually was
involved in the bombing.
For all these reasons, prosecutors thought it was important to look
for more evidence to link Cherry to the bombing. We did not need a
"knock out blow"-just evidence that tended to show that Cherry either
participated directly in carrying out the church bombing or assisted other
Klan members in it.99 Ideally, the gold standard of proof to show this
would have been something close in time to the bombing itself (a matter
of days, weeks or months) which tended to link Cherry to the bombing
and would also corroborate the statements made years later.
The single most powerful piece of evidence in the earlier trial
against Tommy Blanton had been the so-called "kitchen tape." At first
glance, however, it appeared that the tape would not be particularly useful
in Cherry's trial. Cherry's voice is never heard on it, nor is his name even
mentioned.0 0 Also, because it was not a recording of Cherry, it appeared,
at least initially, to be inadmissible hearsay. A closer examination of the
kitchen tape, however, revealed that the tape established an extremely im-
portant fact in the case: the time and place of the meeting at which
Blanton said the bombing was planned and the bomb was made. Al-
though there is some initial discussion on the tape between Tommy and
Jean about "the river" (an apparent reference to the Cahaba River-a
known Klan meeting place), it becomes apparent several seconds into the
tape that the two quickly shift to discussing a different meeting.
98. Wayne Brogdon (the brother of Cherry's ex-wife Willadean) said that Cherry
told him that Cherry helped make a bomb that was used on "[f]our kids in a church
house." Record at Vol. 10, p. 190.Willadean, however, said that Cherry told her that he "lit
the fuse"-implying that he was present when the bomb was placed. Record atVol. 10, p.
142.
99. Under Alabama law, it would not be necessary for the State to prove that
Cherry actually performed any act relating to the bombing (such as making the bomb or
placing it at the church). If we could show that Cherry knew of the bombing in advance
and provided any assistance whatsoever to others who committed it, under the legal prin-
ciple of accomplice liability he would be just as guilty as the actual bombers. See ALA.
CODE § 14-14 (1958).
100. See Record atVol. 7, pp. 1402-03.
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The incriminating portion of the kitchen tape, in its entirety, is:
[J]ean: Well, you never bothered to tell me what you went to
the river for Tommy.
Blanton:What did you tell them I did?
Jean:You didn't even.
Blanton: What did you tell them I did at the river? What did
they ask you I did at the river?
Jean: They asked me what you went for and I told them I
didn't know.
Blanton: They were interested in that meeting that I went to.
They knew I went to the meeting.
Jean:What meeting?
Blanton:To the Big One.
Jean:What Big One?
Blanton: The meeting where we planned the bomb.
Jean: Tommy, what meeting are you talking about now?
Blanton:We had that meeting to make the bomb.
Jean: I know that ... It's what you were doing that Friday
night when you stood me up.
Blanton: (unintelligible) Oh, we were making the bomb.
Jean: Modern Sign Company.
Blanton:Yeah.
Jean: I tell you what got me is when they told me that Mod-
ern--some people at Modern Sign Company said you weren't
there.
Blanton: Said I wasn't there.
Jean: Mm, hmm.
Blanton: Oh, well that's ...
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
Unknown Male: Jean, (unintelligible) you [don't] learn any-
thing with the FBI. Every breath they utter is a lie.
Jean: I know, but I didn't know that then and I didn't know
whether to think you stood me up to go out with somebody
else. That's the first thing that hit me. You stood me up to go
out with Waylene.
When Blanton says "they [the FBI] knew I went to the meeting,"
Jean asks "[w]hat meeting?' '1 2 After Blanton clarifies that he is now talk-
ing about "the Big One"-that is, the meeting where they planned and
made "the bomb"-Jean responds, "Modern Sign Company," then in the
next sentence says, "I tell you what got me is when they [the FBI] told
me that ... some people at Modern Sign Company said you weren't
there.' ' 0 3 Blanton assures her that he was at the Modern Sign Company,
and an unknown man on the tape states, "Jean, you [don't] learn anything
with the FBI. Every breath they utter is a lie.'0 4 Jean establishes the exact
date of the critical meeting two different times in the conversation, saying
"[iut's what you were doing that Friday night when you stood me up"
and, several seconds later, "I didn't know whether to think you stood me
up to go out with somebody else ... [y]ou stood me up to go out with
Waylene ... "105
In 1963 the Modern Sign Company, a known Klan hangout owned
by Klan sympathizer Merle Snow, was located at the corner of Third Ave-
nue North and Sixteenth Street-three blocks from the Sixteenth Street
Baptist Church. Based on this evidence, prosecutors concluded that the
"kitchen tape" did more than just provide damning evidence against
Tommy Blanton. It also established the time and place of the critical
meeting at which the conspirators planned and perhaps even made the
bomb used for the church bombing: Friday night, September 13, at the
Modern Sign Company."6 The question now was, where was Bobby
Frank Cherry the night of Friday, September 13?
101. Record at Vol. 7, pp. 1402-03. The "Waylene" that Jean refers to is Waylene
Vaughn, another girlfriend of Tommy Blanton's. According to Jean's testimony at trial, the
night she was referring to on the kitchen tape was the night of Friday, September 13,
1963. See Record atVol. 9, p. 85.
102. Record atVol. 7, p. 1402.
103. Record atVol. 7, p. 1403.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. In CARRY ME HoMF, her Pulitzer Prize winning history of Birmingham, Diane
McWhorter discussed possible explanations as to when and where the bomb was made,
She acknowledged that most investigators have speculated that the bomb was built at the
garage of Klansman Troy Ingram on Saturday night, September 14th, but went on to note
that some theories hold that the bomb was made at the Modern Sign Company, perhaps
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Proving the exact location of a given person at a specific time is of-
ten a difficult task, even when the time in question is in the recent past.
Proving Cherry's whereabouts on a specific evening after more than
thirty eight years appeared to be nearly impossible. By 2002, the church
bombing case file maintained by prosecutors and agents consisted of
thousands and thousands of documents, pictures, audio recordings, video-
tapes, and other pieces of evidence.10 7 Buried in this mountain of
evidence, however, prosecutors found the final break they needed to con-
nect Cherry with the bombing nearly thirty-nine years before-a five
page, handwritten statement.1°8
Shortly after the church bombing Cherry became a prime suspect.
FBI agents did not immediately attempt to interview him, however, in-
stead deciding to wait for more than three weeks. 0 9 On October 9, 1963,
FBI Special Agents Joseph Ayers and Carl Welton met with Cherry and
discussed the bombing. 10 Cherry denied having any knowledge about
who bombed the church."' When asked where he was on Friday, Sep-
tember 13, Cherry responded that he spent the evening helping to make
signs for an upcoming motorcade to protest the recent integration of the
Birmingham public schools.112 According to Cherry, the location of the
sign-making venture was the Modern Sign Company. Among those that
Cherry said were present to make signs that Friday night were Robert
even on Friday night when "half the dynamite enthusiasts in town seemed to have moved
through the shop .... " MCWHORTER, supra note 2, at 512. At the time she wrote CARRY
ME HOME, McWhorter had never heard the kitchen tape (the public did not hear the tape
until the trial of Tommy Blanton in April of 2001, shortly after McWhorter's book was
published)-a piece of evidence that clearly bolsters the case that the Modern Sign Com-
pany was the site of the bomb's construction.
Moreover, due to its location only three blocks from the church (as opposed to Troy
Ingram's garage or the Cahaba River Bridge, which were miles away), the sign company
was a more logical location for putting together such a large bomb. The church bomb,
which was capable of completely destroying the poured concrete stairs next to the church
and leaving a huge crater and hole in the church wall, would have been extremely danger-
ous to transport for long distances.
107. When the FBI reopened the investigation of the church bombing in 1995, the
FBI's file on the case consisted of nearly nine thousand documents. Record at Vol. 9, pp.
48-49. By 2002 the investigative file, which had grown even larger due to additional in-
vestigation as well as hundreds of pages of grand jury transcripts, consisted of many
thousands of pages.
108. See Record atVol. 8, pp. 1425-29.
109. Record at Vol. 9, pp. 93-94 (Cherry's first interview occurred on October 9,
1963).
110. Id.
111. Record atVol. 8, pp. 1425-29.
112. See id. at 1426.
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Chambliss and Tommy Blanton" 3-the two men who, by the time of
Cherry's trial, had been convicted in the bombing.-"
The agents handwrote what Cherry had told them about Friday
evening."' In-the handwritten statement, Cherry said that he arrived at
the Modern Sign Company at 5:30 p.m. and stayed until after midnight."
6
He described in great detail everyone who came to and left the sign
company. After writing down what Cherry told them, the agents then
instructed Cherry to read the five-page document and to write, in his
own handwriting, "I have read the above statement of this and four other
pages and it is true and correct to the best of my knowledge."'117 Cherry
signed the statement "Bobby E Cherry."'18
Prosecutors recognized that the combination of the "kitchen tape"
and Cherry's written statement were powerful evidence of Cherry's in-
volvement in the bombing.The tape established the time and place of the
critical meeting of the church bombing conspirators, while the written
statement put Cherry at the same location during the same time period.
Together, they appeared to provide prosecutors with evidence close in
time to the bombing itself that corroborated the rest of their case."'
However, finding powerful evidence is not the same thing as getting
that evidence before a jury. In order to implicate Cherry, prosecutors
needed to get both the kitchen tape and the written statement into evi-
dence-only in combination would the two produce the desired
inference. Cherry's written statement did not appear to present a problem.
It was the statement of an opposing party (the defendant in a criminal
case) and so was excluded from the rule against hearsay 2 Moreover, one
of the two agents who took the written statement, Agent Carl Welton,
113. Id.
114. SIKoRA, supra note 3, at pp. 156,220-22.
115. Record atVol. 9, pp. 101-02.
116. Record atVol. 8, pp. 1426,1429.
117. See id. at 1429.
118. Id. Nothing in the case file indicates why the agents took a handwritten state-
ment from Cherry. See Record atVol. 9, pp. 101-02. In fact, standard FBI practice at the
time was (and still is) to the contrary. FBI agents normally do not record, whether via
audiotape, videotape, or signed statement, the statements of witnesses or suspects, instead
relying (often to the dismay of generations of prosecutors) on an agent's paraphrasing of
what the witness said on a FBI Form "FD-302." See Record atVol. 9, pp. 46-48. Needless
to say, prosecutors were glad that the agents had deviated from standard practice in this
case. Cherry's thirty-eight-year-old, handwritten, signed statement, now yellowed but
produced at trial in its original form, was a remarkable piece of history-one that would
come back to haunt its signator.
119. Prosecutors' belief in the probative effect of the tape and statement were con-
firmed when they presented the case to a "focus group" of citizens several months before
trial. After hearing the kitchen tape, the focus group jurors referred to Cherry's written
statement as a "confession."
120. ALA. R. EVID. 801(d)(2).
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was still alive at the time of trial and could authenticate the statement as
Cherry's.'
2'
Admissibility of the kitchen tape, however, was another matter. As an
initial matter, the legality of the tape under the Fourth Amendment-
which had been much debated at Blanton's trial-would not be an issue
here, as Cherry clearly had no legal standing to raise this argument.
1 22
Moreover, authentication of the tape as genuine did not appear to present a
problem as Jean Barnes could identify the voices on the tape as hers and
Tommy Blanton's 123 while the FBI agent who placed the tape recorder in
the apartment and retrieved the tapes could further authenticate the tape by
testifying as to how the recording device functioned. The real problem with
the kitchen tape, however, was getting past the inevitable hearsay objection.
Prosecutors' theory of the case was that Cherry, Blanton, Chambliss,
and others conspired to bomb the church. As a general rule, statements
made by one conspirator during the course of and in furtherance of the
conspiracy are admissible against other conspirators as an exception to the
rule against hearsay."' The problem with arguing that Blanton's statement
in the kitchen tape fit the "co-conspirator's statement" exception to the
hearsay rule was one of timing. Under the co-conspirator exception, the
conspiracy normally ends when the conspirators complete the crime that
they are conspiring to commit and any statements made after that time
are no longer part of the conspiracy. In this case, the crime was completed
on September 15, 1963 and the kitchen tape was not recorded until June
28, 1964-more than nine months later.
12
1
There is, however, a narrow exception to the general rule that the
conspiracy ends with the completed crime. Under Alabama law, if, after the
commission of the crime, some or all of the conspirators participate to-
gether in concealing the crime by suppressing or fabricating evidence, then
121. See Record at Vol. 9, pp. 88, 102. The other agent involved in taking Cherry's
statement, Special Agent Joseph Ayers, had died by the time of trial, demonstrating the
fragile nature of trying a case this old. Had Agent Welton not been alive to authenticate
the statement, its admissibility would have been much more problematic.
122. While Blanton could make the argument that he had a reasonable expectation
of privacy in a conversation that he and his wife had in his apartment, clearly Cherry had
no reasonable expectation that such conversation would remain private. See Alderman v.
United States, 394 U.S. 165, 171-72 (1969) ("The established principle is that suppression
of the product of a Fourth Amendment violation can be successfully urged only by those
whose rights were violated by the search itself .... Coconspirators and codefendants have
been accorded no special standing").
123. Jean claimed that she did not remember the conversation on the tape, but did
identify the voices on the tape and testified that the night Tommy stood her up was Friday,
September 13, 1963. Record at Vol. 9, pp. 84-85.
124. ALA. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E).The rule allowing statements by a co-conspirator is
based on the law of agency-each conspirator is an agent of the other conspirators and
can speak on their behalf.
125. Record at Vol. 7, p. 1402.
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there is a "continuing conspiracy to conceal" and any statements made dur-
ing the course of and in furtherance of this conspiracy to conceal will be
admissible against those involved in the conspiracy.126 Additionally, Alabama
case law explicitly provides that because conspiracies are by their very na-
ture secretive and thus difficult to prove, conspiracies to conceal may be
proven by inference and circumstantial evidence.
1 27
The fact that the Klan members involved in the bombing of the
Sixteenth Street Baptist Church had conspired to conceal their involve-
ment in the bombing seemed self-evident. Indeed, few crimes in history
have been so effectively concealed from so many investigators for so long.
However, in order to get the tape into evidence prosecutors would have
to prove to Judge Garrett's satisfaction 18 both that the church bombers
had conspired to conceal the bombing from investigators and that Cherry
had been involved in this conspiracy.
Proving the existence of a conspiracy to conceal evidence of the
bombing as well as Cherry's involvement in this conspiracy thirty eight
years after the bombing was another challenge for prosecutors. This
prompted another search for small clues in the massive case file. A number
of small pieces of evidence surfaced, however, which provided a glimpse
into the highly-secretive cover-up orchestrated by Klan members years
before. On October 12, 1963, three days after Cherry was first questioned
by the FBI and gave his written statement, Tommy Blanton went to
Cherry's house, asked Cherry if he had been interviewed by the FBI, and
if so what Cherry had told them. 129 During this conversation, Blanton
cautioned Cherry not to say anything near Blanton's car as it was
"bugged.' 3 ° In February of 1965 Cherry told Blanton and Edward Fields
(Information Director of the racist "National States' Rights Party") that
he had "lied all through" the interview he gave the FBI regarding the
church bombing. 3 1 In March of 1965 Blanton and Cherry were driving
in a car with an FBI informant named Mitch Burns when Robert
Chambliss' name came Up. Blanton cautioned Cherry to "[w]atch what
126. See Haney v. State, 603 So. 2d 368, 400 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991) (finding a taped
statement of triggerman admissible against defendant when defendant and triggerman con-
spired for more than three years to maintain alibis and suppress evidence); Duncan v. State,
827 So. 2d 838,852-54 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999) (citing Haney, 603 So. 2d at 399-400).
127. Haney, 603 So. 2d at 399-400 (citing Conley v. State, 354 So. 2d 1172, 1177
(Ala. Crim. App. 1977)).
128. The threshold question of whether there was enough evidence of a conspiracy
to conceal, such that jurors should be allowed to hear the tape, was a question for the trial
judge to decide. See ALA. R. EVID. 104(a) (recognizing that preliminary questions intended
to establish conditions precedent to admissibility are for the court rather than the jury).
129. Record atVol. 9, pp. 113-14.
130. Id. at 116-17.
131. Record atVol. 8, pp. 1447-48.
132. See Record atVol. 7, p. 1376.
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you say around this boy right here Bobby, uh, he don't know too much.
Need to keep it that way."'3  In the same conversation Cherry told
Blanton and Burns "I wouldn't tell them [the FBI] shit ... " and "I
wouldn't tell them [the FBI] nothing, I wouldn't even tell them what
time it was.. .. 3 Finally, there was irrefutable evidence that Cherry had
misled the FBI during his interviews, as there were numerous conflicting
statements regarding his membership in the Klan135 and his relationship
with Blanton 36 and Chambliss.' 7 Based on this evidence, prosecutors
were relatively confident that they could convince Judge Garrett that
Cherry had been involved with Blanton and the other church bombers in
attempting to hide the group's involvement in the bombing, thus making
the kitchen tape admissible as the statement of a co-conspirator.
Jury selection for the trial of Bobby Frank Cherry began on May 6,
2002. "1 After the one hundred and fourteen potential jurors 39 filled out a
jury questionnaire, prosecutors and defense attorneys questioned each of
the potential jurors individually. Twelve jurors were selected (including six
133. Id. The conversation between Cherry, Blanton, and Burns was recorded by a
secret FBI tape recorder that Mitch Burns allowed agents to place in the trunk of his car.
See Record atVol. 20, pp. 538, 548-49.
134. Record atVol. 7, p. 1384.
135. In 1997 Cherry told investigators, and also announced during his press conference,
that he had quit the Klan approximately a year before the bombing. See Record at Vol. 11, p.
404. However, in October 1963 Cherry had told FBI agents that he was a member of the
Klan "security guard" and in September 1964 he told agents that while he was not regularly
attending Klan meetings because of his "responsibilities at home:' he planned to actively
participate when he could. Record atVol. 9, p. 99; Record atVol. 10, pp. 248-49.
136. In October 1963 Cherry told agents that he had met Blanton only two or three
times about two or three years before. He called Blanton a "trouble maker" and a "smart
aleck." Record at Vol. 9, pp. 95-96. In 1997 Cherry told investigators that he always
thought Blanton was a "little thief" and would not let Blanton come in his house. Record
at Vol. 11, p. 408. However, at other times Cherry admitted to having had numerous con-
tacts with Blanton, and during the conversation recorded in Mitch Burns' car, Cherry and
Blanton talked like friends, with Blanton assuring Cherry "when I don't trust somebody I
don't get nowhere near them." Record atVol. 7, p. 1374; Record atVol. 9, pp. 96-99.
137. In 1997 Cherry initially told investigators that he did not know Chambliss well.
Record at Vol. 11, pp. 402-08. Later in the same interview, however, Cherry says that he
knew Chambliss "about as well as anyone did." Id. at 408. On tape in 1965 Cherry is
heard to say "we all like ole Bob [Chambliss]" and that everyone "think[s] the world of
him." Record atVol. 7, p. 1379.
138. See Record at Vol. 20, p. 1. The prosecution of Cherry was truly a team effort,
with prosecutors coming from the local United States Attorney's Office (Assistant United
States Attorney Robert Posey and I, both appointed as "Special Assistant Attorneys Gen-
eral" by Alabama Attorney General Bill Pryor), the Jefferson County District Attorney's
Office (Deputy District Attorney JeffWallace), and private practice (former United States
Attorney and lead prosecutor Doug Jones, also appointed as a "Special Assistant Attorney
General" by Bill Pryor).
139. Chanda Temple, Cherry Jury Selection Continues, BIRMINGHAM NEws, May 13,
2002, at BI.
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White females, three White males, and three Black males)140 after five days
of individual questioning. There were no African American females on the
jury."4 Most of the jurors were too young to remember the church
bombing. 142
We began presenting our evidence in the case on Tuesday, May 14.113
Without any physical evidence linking the defendant to the crime (in-
deed, without any physical evidence at all) or any eyewitness who could
place Cherry near the church, the case consisted entirely of circumstantial
evidence that had to be woven together into a compelling story. Our first
witness was chosen for maximum emotional impact. Alpha Robertson,
the mother of Carole Robertson, spoke of her daughter and the day of
the bombing in a voice that combined the raw power of moral authority
with the intense sadness of a mother who still remembered the fourteen-
year-old daughter she lost thirty eight years before.4 4 Alpha testified about
Carole and about the day of the bombing, remembering details such as
the fact that Carole was wearing her first pair of heeled pumps and had
stage fright about singing in front of the entire church--small details that
made the loss so many years ago more human.
The next set of State's witnesses was intended to give jurors an in-
sight into the events leading up to the bombing, as well as provide a
picture of what the Birmingham of the 1950s and 1960s was like. James
Armstrong, the father of the two boys who had integrated Graymont
Elementary School on September 10, 1963, told jurors how local Black
community leader Fred Shuttlesworth had tried in 1957 to enforce the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education14 by
attempting to enroll his children in Birmingham's all-White Phillips High
School. 146 Shuttlesworth was met by a mob ofWhite men, who beat him
140. Chanda Temple & Val Walton, Jury Verdict in Bombing Hailed as 'Justice Finally",
BIRMINGI-AM NEWS, May 23, 2002, at Al.
141. See id. Media accounts at the time made much of the racial composition of the
jury, and indeed the absence of more Blacks, and particularly Black females, on the jury
was a concern to some members of the prosecution team. Others on the team, including
myself, felt that the case, with its compelling story of the murder of four innocent children
in church on a Sunday morning and the ability to tie the defendant to the bombing
through the combination of the kitchen tape and Cherry's written statement, was strong
enough that the racial and gender makeup of the jury should not matter.
142. Jerry Mitchell, Bombing-Trial Jurors Recall Decision, JACKSON CLARION-LEDGER,
Feb. 24, 2003, at 1A.
143. See Record atVol. 18, p. 135.
144. See Record atVol. 18, pp. 166-74.
145. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). In its landmark decision, the
United States Supreme Court unanimously held that public schools that were ostensibly
"separate but equal" violated the United States Constitution.
146. See Record atVol. 18, pp. 176-77.
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and attacked his family. 147 Armstrong told jurors that there were no further
attempts to integrate Birmingham schools until he filed, on behalf of his
children, the lawsuit that eventually resulted in their admission to all
White Birmingham public schools. '48
Another witness, Jim Parker, a cameraman for a local television sta-
tion, testified that he was present at Phillips High School the day
Reverend Shuttlesworth attempted to integrate the school, having gone1 49
to pick up a transcript. When he saw Shuttlesworth and the mob, Parker
ran back to his car to get his camera and began filming the incident."s His
footage was shown on national news at the time and, years later, in the
Spike Lee documentary FOUR LITTLE GIRLS.5 1 Parker remembered that
the mob arrayed against Shuttlesworth included about thirty to forty
people standing on the sidewalks yelling racial remarks, a group of around
fifteen in the street surrounding Shuttlesworth and his family, and a still
smaller group of around five or six who were directly involved in the vio-
lent confrontation.112 Of all those present, Parker specifically remembered
one particular man who reached into his back pocket and pulled out an
object that he then swung at Shuttlesworth.
1 5 3
Bobby Birdwell, a friend of Cherry's son, was eleven years old at the
time of the bombing and was able to identify this man. Birdwell told ju-
rors that four or five days before the bombing he happened to go into
Cherry's house to get a drink of water when he saw Cherry seated at the
kitchen table with three other men. 54 He saw a Klan robe in the house
and heard one of the men say "bomb" and "Sixteenth Street." ' Birdwell
was shown the video that Jim Parker had taken at Phillips High School in
1957 and asked if he recognized anyone.15 6 Birdwell recognized the man
147. Id. at 177-79.
148. See id. at 179-80. Testimony regarding the attempts to integrate Birmingham
schools was legally relevant because the State's theory of the case was that it was the Klan's
hatred of Blacks, and specifically a violent reaction to the integration of public schools,
that led to the bombing five days after the schools were integrated for the first time.
149. Id. at 197-98.
150. Id. at 198-200.
151. FOUR LITTLE GIRLS (HBO 1997).
152. Record atVol. 18, pp. 200-02.
153. Id. at 203. When asked why he sold his tape to a news station for money instead
of turning it over to the police, Parker responded--somewhat perplexed-that a number
of police officers were present during the beating (so he assumed that the police were
aware of the situation). See id. at pp. 231-32.
154. Id. at 214-16.
155. Id. at 215-17.
156. Id. at 221.
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The story of the bombing of the Sixteenth Street Baptist Church
was woven together through the testimony of approximately thirty more
witnesses."" Members of the girls' families told jurors about the events at
the church the day of the bombing,"9 explosive experts testified that the
blast was a bomb rather than a gas leak or boiler explosion,' 60 and retired
FBI agents testified about Cherry's conflicting statements.' 6' Other wit-
nesses, including Michael Wayne Gowins and Willadean Brogdon, testified
that Cherry had bragged to them about being involved in bombing the
church. 62 After hearing the State's evidence regarding Cherry's participa-
tion in the conspiracy to conceal the bombing, including the testimony of
FBI informant Mitch Burns and the tape recordings made of Cherry and
Tommy Blanton in Burns' car, Judge Garrett ruled that the "kitchen tape"
was admissible as a co-conspirator's statement, and the tape was played for
the jury.163 Jurors also saw Cherry's yellowed, handwritten statement taken
less than a month after the bombing in which Cherry placed himself at
the Modern Sign Company on the Friday night before the bombing.
6 4
At two times during the trial, Cherry's own words came back to
haunt him. When interviewed by Detective Herren in 1997, Cherry told
Herren that he had quit the Klan a year before the bombing because his
157. See id.; Rick Bragg, Prosecutors Try to Recreate Birmingham's '63 Nightmare, NEw
YoRK TIMES, May 15, 2002, at Al. When interviewed by the FBI in 1997, long after the
statute of limitations had run on any potential prosecution for assault, Cherry bragged that
he had "bopped" Shuttlesworth between the eyes with his brass knuckles that day at Phil-
lips High School. See Record at Vol. 11, pp. 402, 413. Evidence of the earlier assault on
Shuttlesworth was admissible under Rule 404(b) of the Alabama Rules of Evidence be-
cause it showed that Cherry had the motive necessary to bomb the church, as both the
Shuttlesworth incident and the church bombing were motivated by a hatred of Blacks and,
specifically, a desire to prevent school integration-by violence if necessary. See ALA. R.
EVID. 404(b).
158. See Record atVol. 9, p. 3; Record atVol. 17, p. 3.
159. See supra note 144.
160. See supra note 47.
161. See supra notes 135-37.
162. See SIKORA, supra note 3, at 233-37.
163. See Record atVol. 9, p. 86.
164. See Record at Vol. 8, pp. 1425-26; Record at Vol. 9, pp. 101-02; Jerry Mitchell,
Church Bombing Trial Goes tojury, JAcKsoN CLARION-LEDGER, May 22, 2002, at 4A.These
two pieces of evidence-the heart of our case against Cherry-were not explicitly woven
together until closing argument. One juror later told me, however, that she immediately
understood the connection between the two and knew that Cherry was guilty. By con-
trast, members of the international media present in court for the trial did not grasp the
significance of the "kitchen tape" and written statement, largely because the tape was diffi-
cult to understand when played in court (the judge, jurors, and attorneys had a transcript
of the tape, as well as special headsets to hear the tape clearly).
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wife was sick with cancer.'6 The only problem with Cherry's version of
events was that his wife's medical records, introduced by the prosecution
at trial, showed that she was not diagnosed with cancer until August of
1965.166 Additionally, Cherry told Herren that he went home on the Sat-
urday night before the bombing and watched wrestling on 
TV 67
However, logs of all Birmingham TV programming placed into evidence
showed that there was no wrestling on TV in Birmingham on that
night. 6 1 Cherry chose not to testify at trial. 169 Rather, his defense con-
sisted of a confusing attempt to blame the FBI for making him a
scapegoat. Cherry's defense was that one individual-Robert Chambliss'
sister-in-law Mary Frances Cunningham-had mistakenly identified him
as one of the four bombers in her statement to the FBI shortly after the
bombing. This one statement, according to Cherry's theory, led the FBI to
undertake a thirty-nine-year quest to convict him of a bombing in which
he had no part. Cherry also called to the stand a number of character
witnesses, including the preacher at his church in Dallas, who said that
Cherry "fit right in" with the multi-racial congregation at the church, and
a grandson who, when asked if he ever heard his grandfather use a racial
slur said, "No-only the use of the word nigger.'
'170
During closing arguments, Cherry's attorneys pressed their theory
that Cherry was just a convenient scapegoat-admittedly a racist, but not
a bomber.17 ' On the prosecution side, lead prosecutor Doug Jones and I
argued that words from the mouths of two of the bombers themselves,
Tommy Blanton on the kitchen tape and Cherry in his handwritten
statement, proved that Cherry was present at the critical meeting of the
conspirators at the Modern Sign Company on Friday night when the
bombing was planned. 172 I argued that the jury could either believe that
Cherry was truthful when he boasted of his direct involvement in helping
to make or place the bomb, or they could believe that he was present at
the sign company and involved in planning the bombing, thus guilty un-
der the principle of accomplice liability. 3 Either way, he was guilty of
165. Record atVol. 11, pp. 401-04.
166. Jerry Mitchell, Bombing-Trial Jurors Recall Decision, JACKSON CLARION-LEDGER,
Feb. 24, 2003, at 1A.
167. Record atVol. 11, pp. 402, 418.
168. Jerry Mitchell, Bombing-Trial Jurors Recall Decision, JACKSON CLARION-LEDGER,
Feb. 24, 2003, at 1A.
169. See SIKORA, supra note 3, at 244.
170. Rick Bragg, Defense Rests After One Day In '63 Bombing, N.Y. TIMES, May 21,
2002, at Al.
171. See Rick Bragg, More Than Just a Racist? Now The Jury Must Decide, N.Y TIMES,
May 22, 2002, at Al.
172. See Record atVol. 24, pp. 148-49.
173. See ALA. CODE § 14-14 (1958).
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murder. Interestingly, although Doug and I did not discuss our arguments
prior to giving them, we both ended by returning to one of the trial's
most poignant images-a photograph of Denise McNair taken by her
father. In the picture, Denise hugs her favorite doll against her cheek. The
doll is White.
174
After about a day of deliberating, the jury returned its verdict.
Bobby Frank Cherry was found guilty of four counts of murder 71 for the
killings of Addie, Carol, Cynthia, and Denise. Cherry's sentence was life in
prison. 176 Before pronouncing sentence, Judge Garrett asked Cherry if he
had anything to say. Cherry turned to our team of prosecutors and inves-
tigators and said, "This whole bunch have lied all through this thing ...
I've told the truth. I don't know why I'm going to jail for nothing. '"
7
IV THE CHERRY PROSECUTION AS "TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE"
A question that I am often asked about the Cherry prosecution is:
why use so many resources just so that an old man could spend the end of
his life in prison?7 In one sense, the short answer is that there is no stat-
ute of limitations for murder and, at least theoretically, any murderer can
and should be prosecuted at any time up to his death. But this answer,
although legally correct, does not fully justify the resources that the fed-
eral government and the state of Alabama spent on years of investigation
and what amounted to a long shot gamble of a prosecution of a seventy-
two-year-old man. To assess whether the prosecution was justified, per-
haps it is helpful to analyze it as an American application of principles
gleaned from the rapidly expanding field of "transitional justice."
Transitional justice is "the conception of justice associated with pe-
riods of political change, characterized by legal responses to confront the
wrongdoings of repressive predecessor regimes."'79 Modern transitional
justice traces it roots to the period following World War 11.18O The post-
World War II model of transitional justice, seen most clearly in the prose-
cutions at Nuremberg, was based on international cooperation in the
174. Rick Bragg, Survivor of '63 Bomb Recalls Glass Shards and a Sister Lost, N.Y TIMES,
May 18, 2002, at Al.
175. SIKORA, supra note 3, at 252.
176. Id.
177. Rick Bragg, 38 Years Later, Last of Suspects is Convicted in Church Bombing, N.Y.
TIMES, May 23, 2002, at Al.
178. Bobby Frank Cherry died on November 18, 2004, his "life sentence" consisting
of two and a half years in an Alabama prison. See Yvonne Lamb, Birmingham Bomber Bobby
Frank Cherry Dies in Prison at 74, WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 19,2004, at B5.
179. Ruti G.Teitel, TransitionalJustice Genealogy, 16 HAv. Hum. RTS.J. 69, 69 (2003).
180. Symposium, The Law and Politics of Contemporary Transitional Justice, 38 CORNELL
INT'L LJ. 837, 839 (2005).
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criminal prosecution of Nazi war criminals. Despite the fact that the Nur-
emberg trials remain largely anomalous, the model they established had a
significant impact on the law of transitional justice. Nuremberg shaped
the law in this area by shifting the focus from national to international
mechanisms, and from collective to individual guilt. 8 The period imme-
diately following World War II was the high water mark of international
justice and cooperation. 8 3 This period saw not only the Nuremberg trials,
but also the founding of the United Nations and the passing of a number
of conventions and resolutions establishing international crimes.
The Cold War brought an end to the era of international coopera-
tion, but a new phase in transitional justice began with the breakup of the
Soviet Union and its empire in the 1980s.8 - The revolutions in Eastern
Europe, new democracies in Central and South America, and the democ-
ratization of South Africa were all examples of this second phase of
transitional justice.'86 The Nuremberg model of justice, based on interna-
tional criminal prosecution, worked in some of these countries, but in
others the desire for justice and punishment had to be balanced against
other values, such as the search for truth, the need to preserve the peace,
or the desire for reconciliation and nation building. Examples of criminal
trials as a form of transitional justice include France's 1987-88 trial of
alleged Nazi Klaus Barbie and Israel's 1961 prosecution of Adolph
Eichmann. 18 7 "Truth commissions"-a response designed to search for the
truth while preserving the peace-were employed in many Latin American
countries (such as Argentina, Chile, El Salvador, Honduras, Haiti, and
Guatemala) and African nations (Chad, Uganda, and South Africa). 'M Due
to different balancing of these interests in different countries, multiple
conceptions of transitional justice emerged during this phase.'89 Some
countries opted for trials, while others chose truth commissions, repara-
tions, apologies, purges, or some combination of these measures.' 90 Thus,
transitional justice today does not comply exclusively with any one sys-
tem. Although the Nuremberg model of international criminal
prosecution has seen a recent revival in the International Criminal
Court'9' and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
181. See RUTI G.TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 31 (Oxford University Press 2000).
182. Id.
183. See Teitel, supra note 179, at 73.
184. TEITEL, supra note 181, at 32.
185. See Teitel, supra note 179, at 75.
186. See id. at 71.
187. See TEiTEL, supra note 181, at 74-76.
188. Id. at 79-80.
189. Teitel, supra note 179, at 76.
190. See id. at 75-76.
191. Id. at 90.
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Yugoslavia, 9 ' other countries have chosen different tools to exact justice
in their transition.
Some commentators view transitional justice with suspicion, noting
that it is "backward-looking" and incapable of ensuring prospective secu-
rity because it is always looking back to the last conflict. 193 Others argue
that new governments should reserve their limited resources for forward-
looking measures that help build the state, such as measures contributing
to economic growth and political cohesion. 1 94 Recently, however, Eric
Posner and Adrian Vermeule have argued that there is no reason to treat
transitional justice measures with any more suspicion than the "ordinary
justice" of consolidated democracies like the United States.1 9 Under this
view, justice during times of transition, whether that transition occurs
during regime change in a foreign country or one of the wide variety of
transitions that occur in a consolidated democracy like the United States,
must be analyzed by a pragmatic balancing of the costs and benefits of the
transitional justice measures employed rather than the naive assumption
that the benefits are decisive in every case. 96 Depending on the costs and
benefits involved, transitional justice measures may be "backward-looking"
and counterproductive or "forward-looking" and worthwhile.
Although the transitional justice paradigm has almost universally
been applied in the international context, the construct does appear to fit
the American South of the 1960s. '97 Clearly, many of the state, county, and
192. See supra note 180, at 841.
193. Ruti G. Teitel, Theoretical and International Frameworks: Transitional Justice in a New
Era, 26 FoWRD-A INT'L.J. 893, 905 (2003). In a sense, of course, all justice is "backward-
looking." What critics of transitional justice appear to mean when they voice this criticism
is that the new regime is looking backward at a time when it should be looking forward-
that is, its focus is counterproductive because it interferes with development of the new
democracy and its economy. See Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Transitional Justice as
Ordinary Justice, 117 HA~uv. L. Rav. 762,825 (2004).
194. CLAUS OFFE, VARIETIES oF TRANSITION: THE EAST EUROPEAN AND EAST GERMAN
EXPERIENCE 84 (Polity Press 1996)("after the demise of the old regime, and confronted
with the chaos it has left behind, we have more important things to care about than retro-
active justice").
195. See Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, TransitionalJustice as Ordinary Justice, 117
HAv. L. REv. 762,764-65 (2004).
196. Id. at 825.According to Posner and Vermeule, costs of transitional justice meas-
ures include overburdening the courts, draining the treasury, burdening officials with
complex technical problems, and confronting the judicial system with insoluble moral
dilemmas. Id. Benefits, while harder to quantify, include providing a method for the public
to recapture lost traditions and institutions, depriving former officials of influence that
they could use to frustrate reform, signaling a commitment to the market and democratic
institutions, and establishing precedents that may deter future leaders from repeating the
abuses of the previous regime. See id. at 766.
197. See TEITEL, supra note 181, at 251 n.152 (citing the Mississippi trial of Byron De




local governments of the Southern United States of fifty years ago were
"repressive regimes" to their African American citizens and, equally
clearly, there has been a significant transition since that time.'9" An analysis
of the prosecution of men like Bobby Frank Cherry as a type of transi-
tional justice measure, subject to a balancing of costs and benefits, as well
as the weighing of values such as the desire to discover the truth, preserve
the peace, or find reconciliation would be an interesting exercise. Without
attempting to definitively resolve the issue of whether such prosecutions
are justified--something beyond the scope of this Article-it appears that
there are arguments on both sides of the issue.'99
On the one hand, the financial costs of such prosecutions are clearly
high. Moreover, the prosecution of an old man for a crime he committed
nearly forty years ago certainly appears more backward-looking than for-
ward-looking. More fundamentally, some have cynically noted that the
recent civil rights prosecutions may be more about restoring the "dam-
aged virtue" of White America than curing the persistent injustice they
purport to address.0
On the other hand, there also appear to be significant benefits to
such trials. One overriding point that emerges from the law of transitional
justice is that not all time periods in the life of a country are created
equal. As Posner and Vermeule note, certain historical periods in the life
of a nation take on heightened importance and will always be more "vivid
and visible" to future generations, creating important social and constitu-
tional precedents.2 11 In emerging democracies these highly visible
historical moments occur primarily at times of regime transition. 20 2 While
consolidated democracies like the United States may not experience such
moments of heightened significance at times of "regime change" (which
ordinarily occurs relatively smoothly in modern democracies via democ-
ratic elections), such moments do exist at times of major constitutional
transition.213 If the civil rights struggle in the American South in the
198. Some would argue that the transition away from repression for Blacks is not yet
complete in the South. Although that may be true, it is apparent that the last fifty years
have brought significant improvement in the rights of Blacks in the South.
199. It is my intention to return to this topic and explore in more detail the value of
the recent civil rights murder trials in the South and the question of whether such trials
should properly be viewed as a type of transitional justice and, if so, whether the costs
associated with these trials are worth whatever long-delayed benefit they may provide.
200. Diane McWhorter, No Trial Closes Injustice's Wounds, USA ToDAY, May 22, 2002,
at 12A (during such trials "the core cause of the conflict-the permanent fallout from
America's original sin of slavery-gets buried in the largely symbolic ceremonies of rec-
onciliation").
201. Posner andVermeule, supra note 195, at 792 n.92.
202. Id.
203. Id. Posner andVermeule cite Reconstruction and the New Deal as examples of
times of constitutional transition in the United States. Id.
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second half of the twentieth century did present such a period of height-
ened visibility and significance, the benefits of prosecuting men like
Bobby Frank Cherry, vividly showing future generations that even in
times of major social and constitutional turmoil the truth will eventually
come out, may have been worth the costs. However, it is apparent that
this is a complex question, not susceptible to simple analysis through a
mechanical balancing of costs and benefits.
CONCLUSION-JUSTICE DELAYED OR JUSTICE DENIED?
The transitional justice paradigm appears to provide a useful lens
through which to view prosecutions like the one of Bobby Frank Cherry.
The initial question under such an analysis--discussed above-is whether
the prosecution of a handful of old men is worth the expenditure of the
considerable resources required to mount this type of prosecution. A re-
lated question, frequently raised in the wake of the verdicts like that in the
Cherry case, is whether or not justice that is so long delayed is really jus-
tice at all, or has justice been denied?
In a perfect world, or even a reasonably just world, Bobby Frank
Cherry would not have lived for nearly thirty-nine years as a free man
after committing the most heinous crime of the civil rights era. Certainly
all of us involved in the church bombing prosecutions, although we felt
that a measure of justice had been done by sending the men responsible
to prison, also felt frustration in the fact that the bombers had spent so
much of their lives as free men, especially in light of the fact that the FBI
had in its possession the entire time the evidence that proved most pivotal
in eventually convicting them.2"4
Perhaps the transitional justice paradigm again helps here. Ruti Teitel
has observed that there is a "complicated relationship between transitional
justice, truth, and history.""2 ' According to Teitel, interest in the pursuit of
such justice does not necessarily wane with the passage of time because
"transitional justice relates to exceptional political conditions, where the
state itself is implicated in wrongdoing and the pursuit of justice necessar-
ily awaits a change in regime. '20 6 The reality is that Birmingham, Alabama
in the 1960s was far from a perfect world and justice was in short supply
when victims were Black and suspects were White. In such a world,
204. When he became aware of the existence of the tapes made in Mitch Burns' car
and the "kitchen tape," former Alabama Attorney General Bill Baxley was so frustrated
that he wrote a letter to the NEW YORK TIMES blasting the FBI for its recalcitrance during
his investigation in the 1970s. SiKoRA, supra note 3, at 185. Baxley's point was that had he
had been given access to the complete FBI file, he might have been able to bring charges
against Cherry and Blanton at the same time that he charged Chambliss. Id.




sometimes justice takes time. At the funeral for three of the church bomb-
ing victims, Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr. eloquently predicted the
short-term effects that the bombing of the Sixteenth Street Baptist
Church would have on the conscience of White America."7 Perhaps he
also foresaw the eventual prosecution of the bombers when he said "the
arc of the moral universe is long, but it bends toward justice." '8 In the
case of Bobby Frank Cherry, the arc was nearly forty years long. In the
end, however, it did finally bend to justice.
207. See Rick Bragg, 38 Years Later, Last of Suspects is Convicted in Church Bombing,
N.Y.TIMES, May 23,2002, at Al.
208. BRANCH, supra note 1, at 197.
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